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Abstract—Service-oriented architectures implemented by web
services technologies provide standardized protocols for com-
municating and sharing information across organizational
boundaries. The composition or federation of the services of
independent organizations allows them to work together to
quickly achieve their common goals. The access control of the
shared services becomes an essential requirement for a secure
federation of services. The identity federation provides part
of the response by allowing users to authenticate once in an
organization and to access the services of others with his autho-
rization information or attributes. However, in a federation, the
organizations may have different access control models that use
authorization attributes with different, or even incompatible
semantics. Interoperability between the access control models
becomes crucial to the federation of services. Existing federated
access control solutions are based on the single sign-on with
common authorization attributes or the identity mapping that
is not scalable in a service-oriented environment. In this paper,
we propose a cross-organizational access control method for the
federation of services protected by heterogeneous access control
models. Our method is based on a new federation architecture
that responds to the heterogeneity of authorization attributes
via independent attributes introduced at the federation level.
Keywords-Access control, Attribute mapping, Trust, Federated
single sign-on, Web service composition
I. INTRODUCTION
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) implemented through
web services technologies provides standardized protocols
for sharing information across organizational boundaries.
With the globalization of business, the federation of services
appears as a solution allowing independent organizations to
collaborate together in order to reach quickly their common
objectives. A federation of service is the composition of the
services of different service providers across organizational
boundaries [1][2].
However, to ensure the security of the services, each service
provider has its own access control mechanism in place to
identify service consumers and to ensure that services are
accessible only to those who are authorized. The service
providers and consumers can have different access control
models using different or even incompatible authorization
methods or attributes. We call the authorization attributes,
the access control information assigned to an entity (user,
service) by a trusted party. We can cite for example the
user’s role of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model,
the user’s clearance of Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
model. The heterogeneity of the authorization attributes of
access control models creates a major challenge for a secure
federation of services. The service consumers must be able
to compose the services of different service providers using
their original authorization attributes. The access control
mechanism of service providers must be able to support the
authorization attributes specific to each service consumer.
The access control mechanisms do not natively support
these service federation requirements. Although the identity
federation provides some of the response by delegating
the authentication to service consumers, the federation of
services requires a common understanding of authorization
attributes. In order to access the services, their consumers
must either transmit their own authorization attributes
or those specific to service providers. In both cases, the
disclosure of the authorization attributes would be a leakage
of security policies informations [2]. Current federation
architectures rely on common authorization attributes and
the identity mapping for the access control. The identity
mapping requires having identities of each service provider
and establishing relationships between those identities.
These solutions are not scalable in a service-oriented
environment where services can be dynamically discovered
and composed.
In this paper, we propose a cross-organizational access
control method for the federation of services protected by
heterogeneous access control models. Our method is based
on a new federation architecture that responds to the hetero-
geneity of the authorization attributes through independent
attributes introduced at the federation level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the Section 2
introduces the basic concepts of the federation of services,
as well as the challenges and limitations of existing fed-
erated access control solutions. The Section 3 describes in
detail our access control method. The implementation of the
proposed method is described in the Section 4. The Section
5 presents the evaluation of our method applied to a case
study. We end with related work in Section 6.
II. FEDERATION OF SERVICES
In this section we introduce the background for service-
oriented architecture, federation of services, the challenges
of access control in the federations, the existing solutions
and their limitations.
A. Background
1) Service-Oriented Architecture: SOA is an approach to or-
ganize distributed resources as autonomous and remotely ac-
cessible units of fonctionalities called services [3]. Services
are discoverable and accessible to end-user applications or
other distributed services via standard message interfaces
and protocols. SOA has three constituent components that
are determined according to three roles assumed by each
component: the service provider, the service registry and
the service consumer or client. The service provider is a
software component that hosts and executes the service
on the behalf of the service consumer who discovered the
service description in the service registry.
Web services provide an implementation of SOA accessible
via standard Internet protocols such as HTTP. A web service
is a self-describing, self-contained software module that can
perform actions on behalf of a user or application [4].
Web services rely on standard protocols such as SOAP
and WSDL for the description of the service interface and
communication messages. The goal of Web Services is to
enable the creation of distributed applications that can be
dynamically assembled by composing existing services as
needed.
2) Interoperability and Federation: Interoperability
is the ability of two or more systems to exchange
information and access third-party functionality [5]. To
ensure interoperability, SOA services can be located in
independent trust domains called security domains. A
domain is a security administration unit consisting of a set
of elements, security authorities, and a security policy in
which the elements are managed in accordance with the
security policy [6][7]. Interoperability between domains
requires common collaboration agreements and a secure
and trusted environment. To achieve full interoperability
between independent and autonomous domains, federation
is one recommended solution. A federation is a set of
autonomous domains that adhere to common rules and
governance policies to control interactions between them
[8]. The federation creates a trusted environment for the
secure sharing of services between domains.
The security of the services is accomplished through the
access control which ensures that only authorized users have
access to the services. The federation allows the domains to
have control over the security of their services. Each domain
can use its own access control model. Access control begins
with user authentication. In a federation, the authentication
is provided by the identity federation, which allows the
users to authenticate only once in one domain and access the
services of others by using a unique identity. The domain
that provides the identity is called the identity provider
(IdP) and the domain that use this identity to provide the
services is called service provider or relaying party (RP).
The users authenticate with IdPs who create and transmit
proof of authentication to the RPs as security tokens. A
security token represents a set of claims that are declarations
made by a third party about the user’s identity attributes,
such as his name, and his authorization attributes. Access
control in domains is based on these authorization attributes.
The exchange of security tokens between IdP and RP allows
the federated single sign-on (FSSO) between the domains.
The security tokens are described using the Security Asser-
tion Markup Language (SAML) standard to ensure interop-
erability between domains. A domain can ensure both the
role of the service provider and the service consumer. The
service federation allows to create distributed applications
using the services provided by the domains of a federation.
A federated service is a service accessible only to authorized
users of a federation [1]. Given the federation’s autonomy
and flexibility requirements, the access control for federated
services remains a major challenge.
B. Challenges
The access control of federated services faces two major
challenges:
1) Heterogeneity of domain authorization attributes
Each domain specifies its access control policies on its
own authorization attributes. When domains use differ-
ent or incompatible authorization attributes, access to
services is either hindered or granted to unauthorized
users.
2) Composition of federated services
The composition of federated services must take into
account the access control of each service and therefore
the heterogeneity of their authorization attributes.
Access control solutions for federated services must meet
the following requirements:
• Federated single sign-on. A user must be able to
authenticate once to the federation and then use the
services for which he has a valid authorization.
• Federated single authorization. A user must be able
to acquire authorizations once from the federation and
access the services on the basis of these authorizations.
• Domain autonomy. Each domain must be autonomous
to control the access to its services.
• Dynamic adaptation to the federation growth. The
domain’s access control mechanisms should not require
significant maintenance efforts during authorization
changes in the federation.
• Confidentiality of internal security information. The
authorization attributes are sensitive information and
should not be disclosed beyond the domain boundaries.
C. Existing federated access control solutions
The access control consists of three essential steps: (i) iden-
tification and authorization of users; (ii) authentication of
users; (iii) control of access authorizations to the services.
The federated access control authentication of users is dele-
gated to IdPs through identity federation. The authorization
of users and the control of access authorizations remain
under the control of RPs. However, these latters depend
on federation architectures, the main ones being Shibboleth,
Liberty Alliance, and WS-Federation [9][10].
With Shibboleth, IdP and RP agree to use common autho-
rization attributes whose semantics are defined through an
LDAP schema such as the eduPerson schema. RPs specify
their access control policies on the authorization attributes
defined in this schema. Shibboleth also offers IdP the ability
to use its own authorization attributes. In this case, the
IdP must map its authorization attributes with those of
the federation to access RP’s services. These mappings
are managed by each IdP and are therefore unreliable.
This may result in unauthorized access to the services.
With Liberty Alliance, the user has distinct identities with
different IdPs and RPs that are connected for authentication
and authorization. In this case, the access to the services
does not rely on authorization attributes, but on the identity
attributes such as name, email as an example.
WS-Federation supports Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance
access control techniques through specialized services such
as authorization service, attribute service and pseudonym
service. WS-Federation also provides identity mapping so-
lutions that consists of converting an identity of one do-
main into an identity in another domain by a third party
approved by the originating domain and the end domain.
However, these identity mappings solutions are not flexible
because they require point-to-point negotiations between
each pair of domain. Identity mapping is not applicable
to service composition because services can be discovered
and dynamically composed. The access control of service
composition requires authorization negotiations going be-
yond two domains. The federated services access control
requires a federation architecture that supports authorization
negotiations for service composition. In the next section, we
propose an access control method that addresses these needs.
III. FEDERATED ACCESS CONTROL : OUR METHOD
Our method is based on a specific federation architecture.
A. Federation architecture
The domains are federated by considering that the services
in one domain are accessible to other domains based on
the trust relationships and access control policies. Cross-
domain access control requires that the authorization at-
tributes of a domain are interpretable in the other domains.
In order to interoperate domain access control models, we
introduce the global access control mechanism (GACM) at
the federation level. The domains no longer need to negotiate
access authorization with each other (plain arrows in Fig. 1),
they only need to negotiate access authorization once with
GACM (dashed arrow inf Fig. 1) and then access domain
services directly with these authorization as shown in the
Figure 1. The GACM serves as an interface between the
domain access control models.
Figure 1: The proposed federation architecture
B. Interoperability between domain access control models
The purpose is to allow domains to understand the autho-
rization attributes of others in order to determine the local
access authorization for those attributes. To achieve this goal
and to avoid leakage of security information, we define the
GACM authorization attributes called federated attributes
independently of the local authorization attributes of the
domains. The federated attribute are public and available to
all domains. Each domain negotiates with the GACM to map
its local authorization attributes to the federated attributes
as illustrated in the Figure 2. This first mapping, called
federated mapping, is registered at the federation level.
Locally, domains also map federated attributes to their local
authorization attributes. We call this mapping, the domain
mapping. The interactions between the domains are then
performed using the federated attributes.
Using federated attributes, domains can grant access au-
thorizations to all other domains in the federation without
knowing their local authorization attributes. As a result,
federated attributes allow domains to collaborate together
regardless of the heterogeneity of their access control mod-
els. The advantage for the users is to obtain the access
authorizations in other domains based on their original
authorization attributes.
C. Access to federated services
We now present how to access the federated services.
Figure 2: Federated attribute for access control models
interoperability
1) Authentication and trust brokering: The access control
relies on the authorization attributes asserted by a trusted
third party. Each domain has its own authentication mecha-
nism called local token service (LTS). The LTS authenticates
users and issues a security token signed by the domain
security certificate. The services of a domain are accessible
only with a security token issued by the domain’s LTS.
In order to establish trust between domains, we introduce
in the GACM a specialized authentication mechanism called
federated token service (FTS) for domain authentication. We
identify the domains and the GACM with the public-key
certificates. The domain security certificates are forwarded
to the GACM which in turn transmits its certificate to the
domains. The domains authenticate to the GACM with the
security tokens signed with their security certificates. In
response, the FTS delivers the security tokens signed by the
GACM’s security certificate. Consequently, the domains of
the federation trust each other through the federated security
tokens.
As shown in Figure 3, to access to a service (SB) of domain
B (dB) from a domain A (dA), the authentication of the user
(UA) is performed with the following steps :
1) the LTS of dA authenticates UA and delivers an security
token (STA) signed with the dA security certificate;
2) dA authenticates to the FTS using STA and obtains on
behalf of UA, a federated security token (STF ) signed
with the GACM certificate;
3) the service consumer use STF to obtain a security token
(STB) from dB signed with dB security certificate. The
STF signature proves that dA and UA belong to the
federation and are trustworthy.
4) finally, SB is called on behalf of UA with STB.
The authorization attributes contained in the STB being
specific to dB, are used for SB access control.
2) Authorization: The security token used to invoke a ser-
vice must contain the authorization attributes of the domain
providing this service. The user initially has the authoriza-
tion attributes of his domain. These initial authorization
Figure 3: Principle of federated Single Sign-On
attributes must be successively mapped to the federated
attributes and the target domain’s authorization attributes
during the authentication process. We assume that the fed-
erated mappings and domain mapping discussed in Section
III-B are already established. To achieve these mappings, we
define a two-level attribute mapping:
• at the GACM level, an attribute mapping provides
the federated attributes corresponding to the domain
authorization attributes;
• at the level of domains (providing services), an attribute
mapping provides domain authorization attributes cor-
responding to the federated attributes.
The attribute mapping is performed during the authentication
process. In the Figure 4, we illustrate the attribute mapping
by considering the steps presented in III-C1. To achieve
the authorization of UA, the authorization attribute of UA
(cA1) is used by the FTS to compute the federated attribute
aFx corresponding to cA1. The aFx sent to dB, is then used
by the dB’s LTS to compute the authorization attribute rB2
corresponding to aFx. This latter is finally used to access
the service targetted by UA.
D. Composition of federated services
Each composed service has its own authorization attribute
requirements. The access control of the service composition
is done at two levels [11]: the composite service’s access
control and the composed services’s access control. This
creates two additional issues: (1) the specification of the
composite service’s access control requirements; (2) and
the federated single sign-on between the composite service
consumer (intial requester), the composite service and the
composed services. We solve these issues by considering two
Figure 4: Sequence of cross-domain authorization
scenarios: (i) we invoke the composed services on the behalf
of composite service; (ii) we invoke composed services on
the behalf of the intial requester.
In the first scenario, the access control of the composite
service is performed like in any federated service. The access
control requirements of the composite service are indepen-
dent of those of the composed services. To invoke composed
service, the composite service follows the authentication
steps described in the Section III-C1.
In the second scenario, the composite service’s access con-
trol requirements depends on those of the composed services
that may be different from one service to another. The
composed services require a security token containing the
authorization attributes of their domains. The composite
service consumer must provide a security token that satisfies
these requirements.
For this purpose,
1) we introduce the token store at the composite service
level to store the security token of the initial requester
(STinit ). The composite service must convey the STinit to
invoke the composed services. But, the STinit contains
the authorization attributes of the domain that provides
the composite service.
2) we perform a new authentication process using the
STinit in order to have the authorization attributes cor-
responding to those contained in STinit .
The Figure 5 illustrates the service composition with this
scenario.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR METHOD
This section presents how to implement our method to per-
form web services access control. The goals is to develop the
required software modules; to select and customize existing
security services to support our access control method.
WS-Trust, WS-SecurityPolicy and WS-Security provide the
basic model of the federation of web services. WS-Trust
Figure 5: Invocation of composed services on the behalf of
the initial requester
is implemented with Security Token Service (STS) that
provides methods for issuing, validating, transforming, and
renewing security tokens. The LTS of domains and the
FTS of GACM are implemented with WS-Trust STS. We
have three types of STS in our architecture: the STS in the
services providers domains (named ST SSP), the STS in the
services consumers domains (named ST SSC) and the STS of
the GACM named ST SGACM .
The implementation of our method involves four steps.
Step 1: Definition of claim dialect of federated attributes.
The security requirements of federated web services
must be specified using the federated attributes de-
fined by the GACM. However, WS-SecurityPolicy
does not define a claim dialect for the expression
of claim requirements. We define a claim dialect
(XML schema) to describe the federated attributes.
Each web service specifies its claim requirements
using this claim dialect.
Step 2: Definition of federation-specific security require-
ments of ST SSP and ST SGACM . First, the target web
service requires a SAML token issued by the ST SSP
of its domain with specific claims. The ST SSP
requires a SAML token issued by the ST SGACM
which also requires a SAML token. The ST SGACM
does not specify the token issuer because it trusts
all ST SSC in the federation.
Step 3: Implementation of attribute mapping of ST SSP and
ST SGACM . The ST SSP and the ST SGACM are cus-
tomized in order to implement the attribute mapping
as illustrated in the Figure 6. These STS must be
able to retrieve authorization attribute (claims) con-
tained in the SAML tokens and exchange them with
the corresponding attributes stored in the mapping
module that contains the pre-established attribute
mapping. We implement the mapping module with
a relational database so that it can be queried in
order to easily find the desired attributes.
Step 4: Implementation of service’s access control enforce-
ment. Web services access control is based on
XACML which has several logically distinct com-
ponents, including the Policy Enformcement Point
(PEP) and the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The
PEP intercepts the SOAP request, extracts the autho-
rization attributes contained in the SOAP message
header and enforces acces decision made by the
PDP. We assume that domains already have access
control policies defined on their local authorization
attributes. As a result, the existing PDP are main-
tained. But, we implement the PEP with Apache
CXF [12] interceptors.
Web services access control requires the composition
of several security standards, namely WS-Security, WS-
Trust, SAML, XACML and possibly WS-Federation. SAML
and XACML are implemented independently. But WS-
Federation, WS-Trust, WS-Security are dependent. The im-
plementation of WS-Federation depends on the implementa-
tion of WS-Trust which depends on that of WS-Security thus
forming the layers of security protocols. This dependency
is difficult to deal with because there are no solutions that
deploy these layers together. The web service developer is
constrained to deploy each of its layers separately. What is
likely to generate configuration errors or impossible to make
them work together. The main web services development
solutions providing the security layers are Apache CXF,
Axis2 [13], Glassfish Metro [14] for those that are compatible
with JAX-WS specification [15] and Microsoft’s WCF [16].
These solutions do not directly integrate the access con-
trol (XACML and SAML). Solutions that integrate access
control such as WSO2 Application Server [17], do not
support WS-Federation or WS-Trust inter-domain. Finally,
the implementation of web services access control becomes
quickly a real challenge.
V. APPLICATION AND EVALUATION
We present a case study on which we experiment the
proposed method.
A. Case study: Federation of Scholarship Services
The case is a federation of three institution systems in-
volved in the payment of students scholarship. Initially,
the scholarships were paid by a national treasury but three
independant higher education institutions are responsible to
grant the scholarship to students: the Center of University
Studies (CUS), the Directorate of Higher Education (DHE)
and Universities. The usual scholarship is allocated by
CUS. An additional aid is allocated to disabled students
by the DHE. Some universities grant on their budjets an
aid to the non-scholars students. The Treasury pays the
scholarships and the various aids for the account of each
Figure 6: The required software modules and their cus-
tomizations for the implementation
institution that dispatches them to students. To this end,
each institution establishes and submits to the treasury a
scholarship payment card consisting of a set of attribution
codes (sc-code) and their amount. Each sc-code represents
a student’s scholarship. In order to facilitate the payment of
scholarships, the decision is taken that all payments should
be now made by the accounting departments of universities.
To put into practice, the CUS, DHE and universities decided
to federate their systems to share securely the scholarships
attribution codes. The CUS provides the sc-codes of the
usual scholarship. DHE provides the sc-codes of disabled
students aids. The Universities collect the sc-codes of their
students at CUS and DHE to establish their payment cards.
The scholarship of a disabled student is the sum of his sc-
codes. The table I describes the different domains that will
participate in the federation.
Table I: Description of the domains to federate
Domain A.C. model Authorizationattribute (role) Web services
CUS RBAC
financial-officer,
accounting-
officer,
chief-accountant
scholarshipService
DHE ABAC cashier,accountant disabled-grantService
UTS RBAC
administrator,
financial,
accounting-
secretary
As described in Table I, the CUS and DHE are the service
providers and the universities such as Univerversity of Tech-
nical Sciences (UTS) are the consumers of these services.
Each domain has its access control model (A.C. model) with
its authorization attributes that are the roles of the RBAC
model. The role is considered in the ABAC model as an
attribute. To create his scholarship payment card, the UTS
accounting department must access the web services of the
CUS and DHE. This requires establishing trust between their
systems and the interoperability between their access control
models.
B. Federation of domains
To federate the CUS, the DHE and the universities, we
follow the steps described in the Section IV.
Step 1 - Definition of federated attributes and the claims
dialect. An autonomous department of DHE, the Department
of Administrative Affairs (DAA) is designated to host the
GACM. A security certificate is created for the DAA,
CUS, DHE and all universities belonging to the federation.
DAA registers the security certificates of the domains. The
CUS, DHE and universities also register the DAA security
certificate. The DAA and the domains of the federation
can now trust each other. The DAA defines the federated
attributes as shown in the Table II and creates the claim
dialect to describe them. The DAA negotiates with the
domains to establish the federated mapping. The CUS and
the DHE establish their domain mapping. The DAA sets
up its security token service, the STSDAA. It is assumed
that the domains already have their STS. Otherwise, the
domains install their STS. The STS of the UTS is configured
to support the claims dialect.
Table II: The DAA federated attributes
Finance
finance-director
finance-assistant
finance-secretary
...
Administration adminitration-directoradministration-adjt
...
Information technology it-administrator
...
Step 2 - Definition of STS security requirements. The CUS
and DHE specify the access control requirements of their
web services and their STS using the DAA claims dialect.
Step 3 - Implementation of attribute mapping. The DAA,
CUS, and DHE create a database to store federated mapping
and domain mappings respectively. Then, they install in
their STS, the mapping implementation which is a generic
software component to query the mapping databases.
Step 4 - Web services access control. The CUS and the DHE
deploy SOAP message interceptors to extract the authoriza-
tion attributes from the SAML assertions and enforce the
services access decision.
After these steps, the UTS and other universities can then
access the web services of the CUS and the DHE to collect
the students sc-codes and create their scholarship payment
card.
C. Evaluation
We evaluate our web services federation architecture based
on the following criteria:
• Applicability: the ease of implementation and integra-
tion into an existing security environment;
• Scalability: the adaptation to the evolution of the fed-
eration like the increase of the number of domains or
users;
• Reliability and security: the trust in the access control;
• Extensibility: the support of others access control mod-
els different from RBAC and ABAC
Applicability. For example, in Section V-B, when an uni-
versity —using an LDAP registry with OpenAM as the
authentication mechanism and a RBAC as authorization
model— participates in a federation built according to our
method, the existing security mechanisms (LDAP, OpenAM
and RBAC) are maintained. OpenAM is configured to sup-
port the dialect of the federation. Internal roles used for
the authorizations are never disclosed to CUS and DHE.
This reduces the dependencies between domains for the
access control. The only change in CUS and DHE is the
implementation of an STS in order to support the attribute
mapping. Our architecture fits well with existing access
control mechanisms of domains and its adoption requires
minimal configuration efforts.
Scalability. The evolution of the federation has no effect
on the access control of the CUS and DHE because of the
stability induced by the domain mapping. Service providers
adapt themsselves only to the evolution of the federated
attributes and not directly to that of the involved domains.
Reliability and security. Federated mapping is only done
at the GACM level. This ensures the reliability of the
authorizations granted by the service providers through their
domain mapping.
Extensibility. Our approach assumes different access con-
trol models in each domain of the federation. But only
the models that group authorization such as Group-based,
Role-based, and Attribute-based are supported. Other access
control models such as History-based are not taken into
account. The domain attribute mapping can be extended with
individual authorization to allow fine-grained access control.
However, our approach focuses more on the access control of
external users to the domains. In the case where the federated
service is used within the domain, the access control of
the service will always use the GACM. Internal use of the
federated service requires a new WSDL interface that does
not employ the federation.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss related works on inter-domain
access control. Many efforts have already been made for
inter-domain access control, especially with the advent of e-
commerce. In the following, the terms domain and organiza-
tion are used interchangeably. The role is the authorization
attribute in the RBAC model.
In [18] the authors proposed for the access control of
inter-organizational workflow, an architecture that decoupled
the security infrastructures of member organizations by
introducing a shared role domain containing the roles each
organization (RBAC) and the relationships between them.
Each organization associates its local role structure with the
role domain. The role domain is similar to the GACM of
our architecture. However, the workflow is considered as
an internal application. Unlike our method, role mapping
is point-to-point and does not require trust management
between organizations.
A similar approach is proposed in [19] for managing fed-
erated access to collaborative network environments. This
approach introduces the notion of federated attribute as a
solution to the heterogeneity between the local attributes of
domains. Each domain must map local attributes to a set
of federated attributes that are used in the context of the
collaboration. Each domain defines its federated attributes
from which permissions are assigned. Conversely, federated
attributes in our approach serve as the common authorization
language between domains to determine local permissions
for external users.
The concepts of Private Virtual Organization (VPO) and
Single Sign-On (RSSO) are introduced in [20] to help
organizations maintain the control over their resources and
users to have permissions in other organizations according
to their role. The organizations must create as many VPOs
as partners. Each VPO has different authorization policies
defined on the roles of the concerned partner. The GACM
in our architecture overcomes this multiplication of autho-
rization policies. The GACM allows organizations to share
the same resources with multiple partners unlike VPO. The
concept of a single role is very interesting for the single
federated authorization, but the disclosure of the role to the
partners constitutes a leak of security information according
to [2].
The federation of web services [1] [21] further complicates
inter-domain access control because of trust management
and federated single sign-on. In [22], the authors propose
to convey the authorization attributes of the user instead of
or in addition to its identity attributes (e.g. his name) in
the security token. We employ the same approach, but we
convey the federated attributes of the user instead of his local
authorization attributes.
A two-level access control architecture is proposed in [2] for
the access control of web service in which the authorization
decision is made in the requester’s domain and attached to
the request invoking the web service. Although this approach
preserves domains autonomy and avoids the leakage of
security information, it is hardly applicable to a federation
of multiple domains that need the information about the
requester.
The WS-Federation standard provides a flexible and extensi-
ble architecture for access control of federated web services.
Our approach extends the WS-Federation architecture by the
GACM for the trust management and the federated single
sign-on. Unlike our approach, the access control with WS-
Federation is based on the user’s identity attributes. Identity
maping approaches proposed by WS-Federation are point-
point and is very complex to apply to the service composi-
tion. The federated attributes used in our approach allow
to perform the access control to the service composition
without requiring complex attribute mapping.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a cross-domain access control method for
service-oriented environments. Our approach is based on
a new federation architecture that allows domains to be
independent and autonomous for the access control of their
services. In this architecture, a domain can be both a service
consumer and a service provider. We introduced a third-
party entity at the federation level, the global access control
mechanism (GACM) in order to establish trust between
domains and interoperability between their access control
models. The access control models of domains interoperate
using the federated attributes.
The federated attributes are used to establish mapping
between the authorization attributes of the domains. We
defined a federation-level attribute mapping between
domain attributes and federated attributes and a domain-
level attribute mapping between federated attributes and
domain attributes. These attribute mappings support
federated single sign-on between domains. They also make
it possible to compose the services of different domains
using heterogeneous models of access control.
We proposed an implementation of our method for the
access control of web services in which we detail the
different steps of implementation, the necessary components
and the difficulties encountered. Our method was applied
to a case study in order to evaluate it according to feasi-
bility, reliability, scalability and security criteria. However,
the current implementation of our architecture is about
functional testing. We have not yet deal with performance
testing. We plan to experiment the access control of service
composition where composed services are invoked on the
behalf on initial requester. Token store integration in the
orchestration engines must be also implemented. We plan to
extend attribute mapping with individual access permissions
to allow fine-grained cross-domain access control.
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